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The Grand Transition (GT) view claims that economic development is causal to institutional 
development, and that many institutional changes can be understood as transitions occurring 
at roughly the same level (zones) of development. The Primacy of Institutions (PoI) view 
claims that economic development is a consequence of an exogenous selection of institutions. 
Our survey of the empirical evidence and our own estimates reveal that it is easy to find con-
vincing evidence supporting either of the two views. Property rights do affect development as 
suggested by the PoI. However, democracy is mainly an effect of development as suggested by 
the GT. We conclude that the empirical results are far too mixed to allow for a robust assess-
ment that one of the two views is true and the other false. This finding implies that focusing on 
institutional development is unlikely to be successful as the key strategy for the economic 
development of poor countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This essay is written to contrast two basic views on the link between institutional develop-
ment and long run economic growth: the Grand Transition (GT) view and the Primacy of 
Institutions (PoI) view. Both GT and PoI have old and strong theoretical roots, and both 
originate from Nobel Prize winners: Simon Kuznets and Douglass North. When presented in 
sensible soft versions, both views describe similar links between institutional and economic 
development. Their differences may be more a matter of emphasis than substance. Thus, the 
reader may with some justice accuse us of setting up a race between two straw men. 
  Both views start from the observation that low income and high income economies, 
over time and across countries, differ in every aspect of development: political and economic 
institutions, family structure, education, health, crime rates, etc. Economic growth as such is a 
major part of the process of development, and it is the easiest part of the process to measure. 
  Throughout the paper, we use the term income for y = ln gdp, where gdp is real GDP 
per capita (in PPP prices). Thus, economic growth is the change in income. The GDP data 
used are from Maddison (2003, and internet
3), updated to 2005 by data from the World 
Development indicators (internet). The typical path of income for a country has long linear 
sections, and it thus appears almost deterministic, though with a few kinks. 
The GT view sees development as a process where steady economic growth causes 
transitions of all institutions. A lucky spark is necessary to set development into motion, but 
then things gradually change in much the same way. Thus, the GT view would interpret cross-
country data as representing an underlying systematic pattern overlaid with country heteroge-
neity and noise.
 In Section 3, we provide a “textbook” model of the GT view that highlights 
endogenous institutional choice as a function of the level of income, as a recent restatement of 
the GT-view appears to be missing. 
The PoI view sees the exogenous selection of institutions as the generator of develop-
ment. One package of institutions causes one development, while another package causes 
another development. Here, it is clear what sets off development – the lucky spark is the one 
giving the good institutions. The key idea is that institutions are chosen, while the growth rate 
is an outcome. In this view, cross-country data would not necessarily contain a systematic 
pattern of development since the selection of certain institutions will not be ubiquitous and 
will not follow a deterministic ordering. PoI has recently been developed into a school by 
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Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (see their 2005). We shall use their survey as our point of 
reference in Section 2. Both views have three problems: 
(i)   The concept of institutions is woolly. We address this by using concepts that allow for 
measurement. We distinguish between two types of data: qualitative data about institutional 
packages known as economic systems or historical inheritances, and quantitative data, which 
are indices measuring one type of institution. These indices are typically semi-quantitative 
only, as they are assessed values on a one dimensional scale with a small number of possible 
outcomes. Scatter diagrams between any such index and the level of income always show a 
strong correlation for cross-country data, as illustrated in Section 6.  
(ii)   Economists like to think of institutions as being chosen by somebody. However, in 
practice the “choice” is often made by an exogenous shock, followed by a complex political 
process, and many “institutions” are thus an “outcome”. In this paper, we short-circuit the 
political process and consider institutions as a choice that is shaped on the one hand by 
development (GT) and on the other hand affects development (PoI).  
(iii)   Institutions (however defined) are stepwise stable, while income has been growing 
almost continuously in many countries over relatively long periods of time. Measures of 
income and measures of institutions consequently have different time series properties. This 
makes the possible empirical tests of the two views asymmetric, as we shall see. Also, it is 
essential to consider rather long periods for measuring institutions and growth, and to allow 
for adjustment lags in the mechanism that links institutions and development. 
We use two data sets to represent institutions throughout. They are the Polity index for 
democracy (internet) that spans over more than 200 years, and the TI index for corruption 
(internet) that covers 12 years only. The two indices are chosen because they both reflect core 
features of the institutions of a country: the degree of democracy is a main macro aspect of 
political institutions, and the level of corruption is a main micro indicator for the quality 
governance. Also, for both indices a controversy exists as regards the dominating causal 
direction, where the disagreement broadly follows the two schools, as will be discussed. 
The search for evidence supporting either the GT or the PoI view has led to two types 
of empirical results: (i) Smoking gun results, which either refer to stories of twin countries 
where the direction of causality between institutions and development is clearly identified or 
to more systematic story telling where a set of institutional changes occurs in a broad (PoI) or 
in a narrow (GT) income zone; and (ii) econometric results, which refer to statistical estimates 
of empirical models of the relation between institutions and development.   3
As we are dealing with broad subjects, virtually hundreds of papers and books could 
be cited, so we have been forced to leave out much relevant literature that is surveyed in the 
contributions to Aghion and Durlauf (2005). Our contribution does not attempt to reach one 
clear result in favor of one of the two views. What we hope for is to get a better understanding 
of the types of cases where one of the views works and the other fails. 
Our analysis will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the two views in more detail. 
Section 3 gives a simple exposition of the GT view which shows its consistency with basic 
economic theory. Section 4 discusses the structure of smoking gun tests and zone tests, and 
presents some such tests. Section 5 surveys econometric results based on time series studies 
of institutions and development, and Section 6 presents causality tests between two standard 
measures of institutions and development. Section 7 holds concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Comparing the Two Views: Differences and Similarities 
 
The key difference between the two views is the assumption about causality, as highlighted 
by Figures 1 and 2. Both views point to a main direction of causality, but accept that there is 
also reverse causality. So the differences deal with the relative strength of opposing causal 
directions. This aspect a priori limits the possibilities to derive clear-cut empirical results.  
 
2.1  The Grand Transition View 
Central to GT is the idea that development causes everything, including institutional change. 
When production rises, societies become more complex due to a higher division of labor. 
More complexity increases the incentives for physical and human factor accumulation. The 
demand for capital and skills rises, so investment and education go up at all levels, and this 
changes both the supply and the demand for institutions in many ways. Also, with rising 
production and specialization, trade must go up, so openness results. With higher production, 
more transactions per unit of time occur, so the increasing opportunity cost of time provides 
incentives for transactions to become more effective. This forces administrations to become 
transparent and incorrupt, making harder the lives of stationary bandits and other dictators. 
  Figure 1 is drawn to depict these ideas. Production is at centre stage. It is causally 
connected both ways to institutions, but the arrow from institutions to production is drawn as 
relatively weak. The key arrow means that production causes institutions, and hence growth   4
causes institutions to change. If such changes are systematic, we term them transitions.
4 We 
know from the World Value Survey (see items E123, F115 and F117 in Inglehart et al., 2004) 
that people at all levels of income do value and prefer democracy and low corruption. Never-
theless, the indices measuring the amount of these “goods” consumed by people in different 
countries (see Figures 10 and 11 below) do increase strongly with income. Hence, in light of 
the GT view, democracy and low corruption may be considered as luxury goods. Also, it is 
noteworthy that most of these goods are not produced in the usual way like consumption or 
investment goods, including human capital; they are almost like externalities that result from 
the process of development, though they do result in a way that depends upon income. 
 









For instance, GT predicts that the level of corruption depends on the level of income, rather 
than causing it. In a poor economy with a low level of production, each transaction can 
consume considerable time. Haggling is an enjoyable way to use time and makes it easy to 
include smart ways of distributing the gains from the transaction. Transactions multiply in a 
rich economy. Here it is essential that each transaction is carried out quickly and efficiently 
and everybody can compare hundreds of identical transactions. Consequently, GT predicts 
that rising income will reduce corruption. 
 
2.2  The Primacy of Institutions View 
5 
The PoI view starts with the opposite direction of causality: As shown in Figure 2, 
unobserved  political power is the central box. Political power is determined by political 
                                                 
4. See Chenery and Syrquin (1975) for a great effort along these lines. Also, the large effort trying to explain the 
growth of the public sector in the industrialized countries from the late 1950s was motivated by this kind of 
reasoning; see e.g. Gemmell (1993) for a survey.  
5. The new wave in the PoI view includes Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001); Rodrik, 
Subramanian, Trebbi (2004); and Easterly and Levine (2004).   5
institutions, and indirectly by economic institutions. Consequently, political institutions 
become the key observed causal variable. By contrast, the arrow from income to institutions is 
weak and indirect, working via the distribution of resources only. 
 











Source: The figure is adopted from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005; p 392). 
  
In the example of corruption, PoI predicts that a high level of corruption causes poverty, 
while a low level of corruption makes countries rich. If the decision makers have some degree 
of choice – e.g. by setting an example – as regards the level of corruption, then one may see 
the choice as one between short run self interest and long run development.  
  Figure 2 does not include precisely the same boxes as Figure 1, but everything is rela-
ted. Both views involve some simultaneity, but have a dominating causal direction as well as 
a central “box” drawn in a bolder line, which influences all other boxes in the complex. Thus, 
we conclude that PoI dominates if political institutions are a strong factor explaining the level 
of development and if the level of production (income) is a weak factor explaining institu-
tions. If the reverse causalities hold, then GT dominates. 
 
2.3  The Two Views as Parts of Different Research Programs  
The two views might each be seen as products of a specific research program. Once the focus 
is set, certain beliefs or guiding ideas facilitate further research, and hence become preferable. 
In the present context, we will show that it is easy to present evidence in support of either 
view, and if enough such evidence is put together for one of the views, it certainly looks 
convincing. From such cumulative evidence, there might originate a subtle shift to actual   6
belief, and then many researchers may jump onto the bandwagon, whereas the alternative 
research program disappears from the literature for some time. 
The GT research program analyzes how growth affects a number of key socio-eco-
nomic variables such as demography, urbanization, and industrial structure. Thus, economic 
growth is taken as an exogenous factor that drives transitions. Several findings of this 
research program have become textbook economics, such as the demographic transition, the 
transition of the sectoral structure of the economy, and the cost disease o f  s e r v i c e s  ( s e e  
Kuznets (1968) and Baumol (1967), respectively). However, few researchers who participated 
in this research program did actually believe that growth was fully exogenous.  
The PoI research program has emerged from empirical studies of the determinants of 
long-run growth.
6 This research program is plagued by the long run simultaneity of every-
thing. Researchers have used various econometric techniques to break simultaneity, but it is 
difficult to know whether these techniques have worked.
7 Thus, it is a great relief if institu-
tions can be taken as exogenous. This does not mean that the researchers did actually believe 
institutions to be fully exogenous – though some school members do appear very convinced, 
causing one of the founders of the school to warn against “institutional fundamentalism” 
(Rodrik 2007; 979). 
An illustrative case is the economics of malaria, where the geography of mosquito 
species may affect the level of income through two channels: directly, and indirectly through 
the quality of institutions. PoI-research claims that once the relation is controlled for the 
quality of institutions, there is no direct effect (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al. 2004). We 
think that this PoI-finding partly reflects the dynamics of bandwagons in research programs; 
see Carstensen and Gundlach (2006) for empirical evidence that both channels matter. 
 
2.4  Causality, the Level of Integration, and the Morality of the Two Views 
Table 1 is setting out the causal assumptions of the two views as starkly as possible. Both 
causal patterns in Table 1 have a level and a first difference version. Consistent estimation 
requires the relevant time series data to display the same level of integration. As mentioned 
before, income (ln gdp) is linear for long periods, whereas institutions are stepwise stable. 
                                                 
6. Seminal papers are by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Baumol (1986), Barro (1991), and Mankiw et al. 
(1992), who developed a set of a dozen explanatory variables that appear to work well in cross-country and panel 
regressions. For a recent textbook exposition, see Barro and Sala-i-Martín (2004). 
7. Most explanatory variables in cross-country data sets can also be thought of as endogenous variables. For 
instance, the inverse of life expectancy is used as a proxy for the exogenous effect of better health on growth, but 
may also be a consequence of higher income. Great efforts are made to use proper instruments in the estimation 
process. However, the reader may still wonder if the chosen instruments can actually sort out causality.   7
Due to the different structure of the income and the institution series, the proper level of 
integration of the two series may be difficult to determine. 
We circumvent this uncertainty by focusing on the model versions termed (A) and (B), 
which we identify as the key versions of the two views and their respective research 
programs. Models (A) and (B) have, as they should, an opposite direction of causality, but in 
addition they also differ by one level of integration. Taken at face value, estimating model 
(A), which is in levels of the series, should produce a higher R² than estimating model (B), 
which is in levels of one series and first differences of the other. (B). So this set up may be 
somewhat unfair to model (B), which we will take into account in Section 6. 
 
Table 1. The Key Causal Difference between the Two Views 
  Grand Transition  Primacy of Institutions 
  Main causal direction:  Main causal direction: 
Level version  (A) Income Î Institutions  Institutions Î Income 
Mixed version  Income Î Institutional reform  (B) Institutions Î growth 
First difference version  Growth Î Institutional reform  Institutional reform Î growth 
Causality of other view  Bias, to be controlled for  Bias, to be controlled for 
Note:  All six versions exist in the literature. (A) and (B) are the main versions that are used in the 
empirical sections below.  
 
When a GT model of type (A) is estimated, the reverse causality claimed by PoI may lead to 
biased estimates, hence instrumental variables have to be used to control for this potential 
bias. Along the same lines, the reverse causality claimed by GT has to be taken into account 
when a PoI model of type (B) is estimated. That is, controlling for reverse causality in case of 
different levels of integration, as in the type (B) model of PoI, may come to look negligible 
and fairly innocent, even if it is not.  
  In addition to these technicalities, a moral aspect may also influence the discussion: 
Most institutional indices have a range from the morally good to the morally bad: Democracy 
and honesty are good, and dictatorship and corruption are bad. In general, the good end is in 
the rich countries, while the bad end is in poor countries. This is compatible with both views. 
But those who fight for good governance want to find that it leads to economic development, 
so that virtue is rewarded. It is less morally uplifting that good governance may be the result 
of economic prosperity, i.e. an extra bonus that accrues to economically successful countries. 
Thus, the PoI view can claim to be more politically correct than the GT view. 
   8
2.5  What Should We Observe in the Pure Cases? 
In the cases of pure GT and PoI, we should observe something similar to the two panels of 
Figure 3. Figure 3a depicts the GT case: The economy has a log-linear long run income path 
and an equilibrium path for institutions – both scaled to be the same. However, institutions are 
stepwise stable. If one step is becoming too wide, a gap may develop relative to the 
equilibrium values. The gap will eventually cause growth to taper off and eventually stop. 
When such problems become evident, a larger reform will – sooner or later – take place and 
the economy will return to its long run income path. If the reforms come in smaller steps as 
immediate reactions to perceived gaps between economic and institutional development, the 
economy can grow along its steady state path over long periods of time.  
 
Figure 3. What Should We Expect to See in the Pure Cases? 













Harmful institutions may generate large rents to strong interest groups, making them willing 
to use enough coercion to preserve the status quo until some exogenous chocks occur. Conse-
quently, this describes a process with an exogenous element in the reform dates, even when 
the pressures for a reform build up endogenously. 
Figure 3b shows an economy with multiple (log linear) steady states depending upon 
exogenous institutional choices (PoI case). Path 1 is the case of a country with two good insti-
tutional reforms (1) and (2). Path 4 is the case of a country with two bad institutional reforms. 
Path 2 and 3 are cases with one good and one bad reform. If the reforms are exogenous as 
hypothesized by PoI, and we consider one big reform that remains unchanged, then the good   9
and the bad reforms are easy to distinguish. But if the reforms are made in small steps by 
decision makers who consider the evidence, then an element of reverse causality enters. So 
the two views are difficult to keep “pure”, even in their most stylized versions. 
 
3.  A Neoclassical Interpretation of the GT View 
 
The introduction listed the crude assumption economists often make that the institutions of a 
country are chosen, and the growth rate of income is an outcome. However, standard micro-
economic theory explains the choices of consumers and producers as an endogenous response 
to exogenous preferences, technology and income. A similar reasoning holds for the GT view, 
where the institutional choice of a country is seen as an endogenous response to exogenous 
preferences, technology and income.  
Two main simplifications are used to generate Figures 4-6. First, the number of 
decisions made in the country is taken to be proportional to GDP. Second, each decision can 
be made democratically or dictatorially, and the fraction of democratic decisions is the degree 
of democracy as measured by the Polity index.  
 
Figure 4. Choosing the Degree of Democracy: The Basic Curves 













3.1 Technology  and  Preferences 
We consider the institutional outcome of a country as the production of the two goods, dicta-
torship and democracy, where both goods are measured in terms of the number of decisions   10
that have to be taken at a given level of income. We use the transformation curves of Figure 
4a to express the technology of the production decision, and the indifference curves of Figure 
4b to express people’s preferences for the two goods. 
  The transformation curves in Figure 4a connect the points where the same level of 
production (income) Y is reached under different political systems. Some decisions are better 
made in a decentralized and democratic process, while others are better made fast and 
centralized by a dictator, so there are always institutional choices to be made, even at higher 
levels of income. As production rises, Y1 Î Y2 Î Y3, we assume that it becomes harder for a 
dictator to keep track of everything from the top and to make sensible decisions. Hence, larger 
steps are necessary at the dictatorship axis than at the democracy axes for a given increase in 
production, as reflected by the biased transformation curves in Figure 4a.  
Put differently, we assume that a given increase in production would result in a 
decrease in the degree of democracy with homothetic demand and all else constant (not 
shown). By contrast, a constant degree of democracy with rising levels of income, which can 
be represented by the points x on the straight line D, could only result if the presumed supply 
side bias towards dictatorship is counterbalanced by a demand side bias towards democracy. 
 














We assume such a demand side bias towards democracy in Figure 4b. The indiffe-
rence curves connect points where the same level of utility is reached for alternative political 
systems. We assume that all else constant, people prefer democracy to dictatorship, so the   11
curves are closer together in the vertical direction than in the horizontal one, as drawn. Thus, 
with homothetic technology, a given increase in income (production) would result in an 
increase in the degree of democracy. 
  Figure 5 combines transformation curves and indifference curves from Figure 4, with 
the Y’s, the I’s, and the D’s as before, and adds a set of equilibrium budget constraints – the 
B’s. The slopes of the B-lines represent the relative costs of dictatorship vs democracy. The 
equilibrium income path of the political system (η), which can be predicted from this most 
simplified set of assumptions, depends of course on the size of the supply bias towards 
dictatorship and the size of the demand bias towards democracy. As we have drawn Figure 5, 
economic growth gradually generates more democracy. As Y increases, the political optimum 
moves from x1 to x2 and to x3, with the slope of the D-line falling, which indicates that the 
opportunity costs of democracy are predicted to rise with rising income. Under the assump-
tions being made, the political equilibrium path would have a negative slope, ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ Y η ) 
after a point like x3, which implies that the tendency towards a democratic equilibrium would 
become enforced after a certain threshold level.
8 
 
3.2  The Welfare Loss from Deviating from Optimal Institutions 
Except for the border case of a constant level of democracy, it follows that if a political 
system is kept unchanged in the course of economic development, people get unhappier with 
the prevailing system, as shown in Figure 6 continuing our previous case.  
  When the country is poor ( 1 Y ), the political system may be chosen as represented by 
the D-line, which intersects the Y1 curve in x1a. Here the optimum is in x1e, where the indiffe-
rence curve I1 is tangent to the production possibility curve Y1. The welfare in x1a is 
equivalent to the welfare in x1b that is on the same indifference curve I1c. As per the compen-
sation principle, the suboptimal choice of political system causes a welfare loss of WL1, 
measured in GDP units. This is a relatively small loss. 
 Imagine that the same political system is preserved and income grows to Y2. The D-line 
intersects the Y2 curve in x2a. Here the optimum is in x2e, where the indifference curve I2 is 
tangent to the production possibility curve Y2. Now the intersection point x2a is quite far from 
the equilibrium value, x2e. Here the compensation principle leads to the welfare loss, WL2, 
which is not only larger in absolute terms but also relatively to Y. At that point, the 
                                                 
8 However, assuming a relatively larger supply bias towards dictatorship than in Figure 6, we could also predict a 
declining equilibrium level of democracy with rising income or, as a border case, a constant level of democracy 
throughout the process of economic development.   12
indifference curve is tangent to the transformation curve for the income level Y2c. We thus 
have the general expression:  ( ) c WL U Y Y =− , where U is the utility function. 
 















  The same analysis can be made for other institutional choices, generating transitions 
when income rises. This analysis is surely hugely simplified, but it offers an explanation of 
the main correlations between measures of institutions and measures of development that is 
close to the bones of economics. It is, as we shall see, not obvious that this explanation is 
inferior to the PoI view.  
 
4.  GT and PoI Stories: Smoking Gun Tests 
 
In the history of science, a good story has sometimes been more convincing than a formal test. 
In the discussion between the two views on institutions and development, convincing stories 
have been told. As we shall show, it is easy to tell many stories supporting either view. 
 
4.1   Guns: Twins and Zones 
A smoking gun is a story where facts are clear and the direction of causality can be only one. 
We consider two types of smoking gun tests, twin tests and zone tests. Twin tests are mainly   13
qualitative, and we differentiate between false and true twin tests. Zone tests are semi quanti-
tative since they consist of a set of stories where a change happens in the same zone of deve-
lopment. Table 2 structures the hypotheses of smoking gun tests according to GT and PoI.  
 
Table 2. The Main Structure in Smoking Gun Tests 
    View  Twin tests  Zone tests 
GT: 
income Î institutions 
False twins: Countries with different  
initial institutions develop in the same way 
An institutional change occurs 
in the same zone of development 
PoI: 
institutions Î growth 
True Twins: Similar countries with  
different institutions develop differently 
The same development follows after 
the introduction of certain institutions 
 
In the smoking gun tests, institutions are “measured” in the form of packages, i.e. 
basically as binary dummies. This corresponds to our observation that institutions are 
stepwise constant. The stories told with smoking gun tests thus have to do with endogenous 
steps in institutions that are clearly caused by economic development (GT), or with 
institutions that are clearly exogenous and cause a particular development (PoI).  
Figure 7 depicts the logic of twin tests. Figure 7a considers two countries with insti-
tutions formed by different histories, but where, nevertheless, the economies after a point t1 
develop in the same direction (false twins). Such stories are easy to tell about the West, which 
is now converging although a long and complex story can be told of each country. For 
instance, it is puzzling – from a PoI consideration – that the Russian ex-colony Finland and 
imperial France have reached the same income level. 
  Figure 7b considers two countries with the same history, culture and institutions. 
Development of such true twins is similar up to a point where they are subjected to an 
asymmetrical exogenous institutional shock. It gives them a different system of institutions so 
that institutions change from system D0 to D1 in twin 1, and from D0 to D2 in twin 2. In the 
case drawn, the change to system D1 involves a transition crisis, but then the new system 
gives higher growth, while the change D2 is a small change giving no crisis, but slightly less 
growth. If the twins are compared between time t0 and t1, we have to conclude that the institu-
tions D1 are worse than institutions D2, but at any time after t1, we would conclude that 
institutions D1 are superior. Country-twins are of course never fully identical, so there are 
some differences before t0, even in the case of divided countries. Obviously, the more 
different the development paths, the larger are the differences that can be accepted in the   14
years before t0 for applying a true twin test. In any case, the conclusion would become clearer 
as time goes by and the smoking gun comes to smoke more and more. 
 
Figure 7. Smoking Guns of the Twin Type 
(7a)  False Twins: Different Institutions,     (7b)  True Twins: Different Institutions 












  Zone tests provide another possibility to assess the empirical relevance of GT and PoI. 
For instance, we should observe that certain well-defined institutional changes occur at 
approximately the same level of income if the GT view is right. Here, it would be more 
convincing to look at institutional changes that occur at relatively later stages of development. 
But if the PoI is right, we should not observe any such zones. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005) also consider cases of country groups, where one group is clearly ahead at 
some point in time; then, the other group changes institutions, and after some time, this group 
is clearly ahead. This they term reversal tests. Such tests obviously demand long time-spans. 
Since we have long time series for the degree of democracy, we shall take the change to full 
democracy as the measure of institutional change for our zone tests.  
 
4.2   False Twins: Institutions Are Irrelevant 
Figure 8 shows two pairs of Western countries that look like twins, but differ at closer inspec-
tion. This is a parallel to the swallow and the swift, which have developed the same form 
from different bird families.   15
 
















A remarkable closely matching income development is the one of Canada and 
Denmark. The gdp-curves cross no less than 15 times during the 20
th century. However, the 
two countries have little mutual trade; they export different goods, and belong to two different 
trading blocks. Canada is one of the most Anglo countries, though it has a corner that is not, 
while Denmark was never a colony and has home-grown Nordic-Germanic institutions. Also, 
the short run correlation between the growth rates is not particularly high. 
The other false twins are Portugal and Greece. Portugal is an old imperial power with 
the history, culture and institutions of the Iberian Peninsula. Greece was a province in the 
Ottoman Empire till the middle of the 19
th century. The two countries have thus had very 
different histories, cultures and institutions. However, they started to converge early in the 
20
th century, and since 1948, they have followed virtually the same gdp path. Finally, we have 
added Israel, which is unique in many respects, but nevertheless has very much the same 
development as Greece and Portugal. 
Another set of false twins are the four Asian Tigers, who have had a similar mira-
culous economic development. The controversy among those who explain the miracle has 
pointed to large institutional differences due to their past colonial history (see Paldam, 2003). 
Taiwan and South Korea have a Japanese colonial past, and they were both under US   16
occupation (as was Japan). They do have Japanese style regulations that deviate significantly 
from laissez faire. Hong Kong and Singapore are city states with a British colonial past. They 
are the two countries that are closest to laissez faire. However, initial institutional differences 
have not mattered for their miracles. 
 
4.3   True Twins: Institutions Are Crucial 
The most conspicuous cases of true twins concern countries that ended up at different sides of 
the Iron Curtain after the Second World War, where one twin got a western style capitalist 
package, while the other twin got a Soviet style socialist package. This is a parallel to the 
Darwin finches, which developed into different birds in different ecological niches. 
 
Table 3. Twins with Different Economic Systems 
Capitalist  Socialist  System difference starts  Duration  Resulting difference 
twin twin  year  initial 
difference 
a) 
Years  In gdp  Polity points 
South Korea  North Korea  1946  0%  60  12 times  17 (2003) 
West Germany  East Germany  1946  10%  44  3 times  19 (1988) 
Finland  Estonia  1939/44  -10%  46  3 times  16 (1988) 
Austria Czechoslovakia 
b)  1946  20%  44  3 times  17 (1988) 
Austria  Hungary  1946  30%  44  3 times  12 (1988) 
Chinese Tigers 
c)  China  1948  50%  58  5 times  12 (2003) 
Finland  Russian SR  1918  25%  72  4½ times  15 (1988) 
Costa Rica  Nicaragua  1979  25%  10  3 times  11 (1990) 
Dominican Rep.  Cuba  1960  -40%  45  25%  15 (2003) 
Note:  (a) The excess gdp in percent of the capitalist twin at the start. Finland and Estonia have almost the 
same language and history till 1939, when Estonia was forced to join the USSR. (b) Czechoslovakia is now 
divided into the Czech and the Slovak Republics, where the latter is about 20 percent poorer, but catching up. 
The Polity point difference measures the difference in democracy on a 20 point scale, where the capitalist twin is 
always much more democratic. (c) The Chinese Tigers are Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Table 3 gives twin evidence with 9 smoking guns supporting the PoI view. The table 
is made so that the most alike twins are at the top, and the least alike twins are at the bottom. 
The transition costs after the exposure to a new environment were surely bigger for the 
socialist twin. This may explain a fall by 50 percent in the period just after the system change, 
but then there should be a catch up according to GT, so over e.g. a 40 year period there ought 
not to be any effect of the transition costs left. In none of the cases of the table, the socialist 
twin caught up with the capitalist twin, but instead kept sinking further behind. Consequently,   17
this evidence shows that a socialist system is inferior to a market system as regards the level 
of development. Also, a very large difference appears in democratic rights. 
There are plenty of other twin tests comparing similar countries which get different 
systems at some point in time, and then diverge. The case of Burma/Myanmar and Siam/-
Thailand is puzzling. The two neighboring tropical Buddhist countries had almost the same 
gdp in 1910-40. In that period, Thailand remained formally independent, and somehow 
muddled through, developing its own blend of institutions. Burma was lucky and was a 
British colony during the 19
th century, where the country got the good Anglo colonial institu-
tions. But today Thailand is ahead by about 4½ times in gdp and 16 points on the Polity scale, 
so over the last 50 years something has mattered very much for differences in the standard of 
living, but it is not the colonial inheritance of the two countries.
9 
Also, it is easy to find African cases that demonstrate that different institutions give 
different developments. The two Congos provide a case in point: Maybe French institutions 
are much superior to Belgian ones. Another case is the two neighboring cocoa colonies that 
became Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire; it is not easy to draw a conclusion as regards the produc-
tivity of British and French colonial institutions when a 50 year time horizon is considered.  
Our examples of false and true twin tests are meant to reveal that it is easy to find 
smoking guns held by rather different hands. Maybe we can read the evidence as saying that 
institutions appear to be irrelevant within some range, but that very large differences do 
matter, and that, in particular, socialist institutions are bad for development. 
 
4.4  Zones of Change: Change to Democracy 
We now look at the semi-quantitative evidence provided by zone tests on the relation between 
political systems as measured by a democracy index and development. For a start, we note 
that all present high income countries (by the World Bank definition) can be placed into one 
of two categories: (1) Most countries are rich because they have already gone through the GT. 
(2) The other countries in this group are rich because they have abundant resources (notably 
oil). Our first finding is that within the zone of high income countries, all countries in cate-
gory (1), except Singapore, are democracies, but no county in category (2) is a democracy. 
These facts point to an institutional change towards democracy as the result of economic 
development. 
                                                 
9. Findlay (2005) discusses the post-colonial development of Burma: It appears that the country acquired a 
unique blend of Buddhist socialism and military cleptocracy, which has been quite effective in preventing 
development.   18
A closer look shows that some of the rich countries were already rich and democracies 
in the year 1900, and that they all experienced their democratization in the 19
th century when 
they grew rich. The Maddison (2003) data has 142 countries with gdp data for both 1950 and 
2000. We have calculated the fraction of the US gdp of each country as a measure of wealth. 
Countries with fractions from 40 and up are termed rich.
10 With this definition the 12 
countries of Table 4 have joined the club of rich countries in 1950-2000. Three of these 
countries became independent with an exogenously influenced constitution in 1950-2000. 
They are listed at the lower section of the table. 
 
Table 4. The 12 Countries Joining the Rich Countries in 1950-2000 
  Fraction  Polity score  Change to democracy 
  1950 2000 1950 2000 Change  Years  Fraction 
South Korea   8  51  -3  8  +11  1986-88  32 
Taiwan 10  59  -8  9  +17  1986-92  44 
Greece 20  43  4
a) 10  +6  1973-75  46 
Portugal  22 50 -9 10 +19 1973-76  41 
Spain  23 54 -7 10 +17 1974-78  50 
Israel  (*)  29 57 10 10  No     
Ireland  36  78 8 10  +2     
Italy  37 67 10 10  No     
Austria  39 71 10 10  No     
Japan*    20 75 10 10  No  Start  1952 
Singapore*  23  79  7, -2  -2  0  Start 1959, 1965
b) 
Trinidad and Tobago*  38  48  8  10  +2  Start 1962 
Note: The  term  fraction is the fraction of the US gdp in the year in per cent. A * indicates that the 
countries became independent in the period or very close to. No means that the Polity score was already 
10 in 1950. The Polity index goes from -10 for a full dictatorship to +10 for perfect democracy. (a) 
Greece became a hard dictatorship between 1967 and 1973. (b) Singapore was part of the Malaysian 
Union 1962-65, where the change to less democracy happened. The Polity Score has not changed since 
1965. 
 
In the other nine countries, the degree of democracy was not imposed exogenously, so 
in principle it may have changed either before the country became rich or after. In the five of 
the countries that were poorest in 1950, the institutional framework did change – in all cases 
towards democracy. The zone of change was at an income fraction in the range of 32-50 
percent of the US level. All countries that were already above that zone in 1950 were 
                                                 
10. This is an attempt to approximate the World Bank category of high income, which uses another data set. Our 
definition gives 21 rich countries in 1950 and 27 in 2000. 14 countries joined the rich group, and 6 left it. Polity   19
democracies by then. This suggests that the five countries that were poorest at the start did not 
become rich because they were democracies, but became democracies when they became 
rich. Thus, Table 4 contains 5 smoking guns for the GT view. 
However, the table also contains two exceptions. Singapore has remained a controlled 
democracy since 1965 when it chose its present system despite strong economic growth. 
Thus, it is a gun that does not smoke in favor of any of the two views. Israel became a demo-
cracy from the start in 1948 when the country was rather poor, and has remained democratic, 
so it is a smoking gun for the PoI view. Similarly nice stories may one day be told of two fast 
growing LDC-democracies: India and Mauritius. 
 
4.5.  A Reverse Zone Test: Divergence of Development or Convergence of Institutions? 
Given that sets of different institutions are imposed on countries at a similar stage (zone) of 
development, the PoI view would predict a divergence of development, whereas the GT view 
would predict a convergence of institutions to a level that is consistent with the level of 
development. Nearly all African countries are ex-colonies that became independent between 
1956 and 1990, with 1960 as the big liberation year. Most new states departed peacefully 
from colonialism, but even those which did not normally started out with a constitution that 
was made in cooperation with the former colonial power. That is, the adopted constitutions 
mainly differed by former colonial power, and were largely exogenous to the level of 
development of each individual new state. 
  Figure 9 shows the institutional development, as measured by the Polity index, of 39 
Sub-Saharan ex-colonies from the date of liberation over the next 15 years.
11 These data 
expose a striking pattern. Apparently, the British ex-colonies started with relatively demo-
cratic constitutions. The French ex-colonies, which were slightly poorer on average than the 
British ex-colonies, adopted substantially less democratic constitutions. The remaining ex-
colonies began with democracy levels that were in between. However, nearly all of the cross-
country variation in the level of democracy had vanished only eight years after independence, 
when all the political systems had converged to almost the same level of dictatorship. The 
small institutional difference left between the British and French ex-colonies is easy to 
explain, with reference to the GT view, by the corresponding difference in income. We should 
                                                                                                                                                          
data are available for all these countries, except for two  of the joiners (Hong Kong and Puerto Rico), which are 
not independent. The World Bank data include 12-15 rich countries that are too small to be in the Maddison data. 
11. The countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo (Bra), Congo (Kin), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte D'Ivoire,   20
add that the African countries do show economic divergence.
12 However, the divergence was 
rather small until 1987, when most of the countries had been free for 15 years. Since then, it 
has been stronger, but the pattern of divergence does not follow the pattern of the colonial 
past in a systematic way. 
 















Overall, we interpret this evidence as a case of institutional endogeneity explained by the 
level of income, as discussed in Section 3. The case of the Sub-Saharan ex-colonies exem-
plifies that imposing fairly democratic institutions irrespective of the level of development 
may turn out to be a futile exercise since convergence to the (low) equilibrium level of 
institutional quality that is consistent with the level of development appears to have been 
reasonably fast. This empirical evidence thus supports the GT view. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
12. The terminology is in accordance with Barro and Sala-i-Martín (2004). They define σ-divergence as an 
increase in the standard deviation of log gdp (GDP per capita) across countries over time. They define β-
divergence as a positive correlation between the growth rate of gdp and the initial level of gdp.   21
5.  GT and PoI Evidence: A Brief Review of Some Econometric Studies 
 
Our review covers several hundred papers, but only indirectly by referring to more compre-
hensive surveys. Also, it only considers the relations between two measures of institutions – 
the indices of democracy and corruption – and income (y = ln gdp) and its rate of growth (g = 
∆y). We will not attempt to cover all other variables that have been included in the estimated 
equations reported in the literature.  
In line with our discussion of the two views in the preceding sections, we organize our 
review of results for each institutional measure by interpreting the GT view as looking at the 
relation from the level of income to the institutional index, and the PoI view as looking at the 
relation from the institutional index to subsequent growth, and takes the GT view into account 
as generating a potential bias of the estimates that has to be controlled for. Thus, it is a two-
handed review: On the GT-hand are the income-driven transitions of democracy (5.2) and 
corruption (5.4), and on the PoI-hand are the effects of democracy (5.3) and corruption (5.5) 
on growth. 
 
5.1  Measures of Institutional Quality: Indices of Corruption and Democracy 
Many institutional indices exist, but we confine our review to two main groups. One looks at 
the prevalence of corruption at the grass root level, and the other classifies political systems  
by a democracy index. The typical correlations are given in Table 5. Good institutions – 
honesty and democracy – are strongly related to a high income as presumed by (A), but not 
very strongly to high growth as presumed by (B).  
 
Table 5. Average Correlations – Orders of Magnitudes 
  System of rules/ norms  Institutional index  (A) Income  (B) Growth 
(i)  Grass root  Honesty/corruption indices, κ  0.6 to 0.8  0 to 0.2 
(ii) Political  Democracy/dictatorship  indices,  D  0.4 to 0.7  0 to 0.2 
Source: Our summary of the literature cited and own calculations. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show the correlation between our two measures of institutional qua-
lity and income. The samples typically cover 100 to 170 countries. In both figures, a deviating 
country group has been singled out to show that there is more to be explained in these data 
than can be done by a measure of income alone.   22































Note to both figures:  The horizontal scale has a range of 3.5 to 4 points between the top 
and bottom deciles, or as 
3.75 42 e ≈ , it has a range of about 40 times. The scale for the Polity 
index goes from -10 (full dictatorship) to + 10 (full democracy). The scale for the TI 
corruption index goes from 0 (full corruption) to 10 (full honesty).   23
It should be noted in this context that the research groups producing each institutional 
index have a purpose which they state very clearly: They want to advocate the choice of good 
institutions, and therefore want to show that virtue is rewarded. Consequently, these groups 
are strong proponents of the PoI view. This might bias the way the indices are compiled, but 
probably only marginally. 
 
5.2  GT: The Democratic Transition
13  
According to the GT view, there is a dominant causal link from income to democracy, and 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 already hinted at fairly robust evidence on the basis of twin tests and 
zone tests. To come up with more systematic evidence, empirical models have been estimated 
that explain a democracy index, D,
14 for a time period T of 3-20 years, with income 
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If a variable is provided with the subscript -1, it means that the value for the previous period is 
used. The (transposed) x-vector contains j controls, i is a country index and t is a time index, 
and the Greek letters are the coefficients to be estimated. The v’s and u’s are i.i.d. residuals. 
We only discuss the  's β  and the 's. δ  
Model (1) gives the pure cross country estimates, which in the GT-view give the long 
run income effect, 
** .
T β β ≈  Model (2a) is estimated as a dynamic panel. Here, 
T β represents 
the adjustment to income in the average country within the period T, while 
T δ handles the 
inertial element. Thus,   and 
TT β δ  give the dynamics of adjustment in the average country. 
The two estimates allow us to calculate the steady state value 
T β β
∞ ∞ ≈  (2b), and the adjust-
ment path of the political system to income changes (2c). By the GT view, the two estimates 
                                                 
13. Since Lipset (1959, 1994), it has been known as Lipset’s Law, but we prefer the term of the headline. 
14. Three indices exist for the degree of democracy/dictatorship: The Gastil Index from Freedom House, The 
Polity index from The Institute of Peace Research at the University of Maryland, and The Vanhanen Index by 
Tatu Vanhanen, Helsinki University. All three indices tell very much the same story. We shall not distinguish 
between results reached using the one or the other index at present.   24
of the long run should be the same: 
* , β β
∞ ≈  and we expect that they are both robust to the 
choice of T.  
Borooah and Paldam (2006) survey the literature and present systematic estimates of 
,  and 
TT δ ββ
∞  for a range of Ts on a sample of 145 countries over 33 years. As expected, 
T δ starts just below 1 for T = 1 and falls gradually to about 0.5 for T = 16. The estimates of 
T β  rise correspondingly so that the implied estimates of β
∞ are trendless for a broad range 
of Ts and very close to the GT-estimates using pure cross-country samples. The review of the 
dynamic estimates shows a long implied adjustment time of democracy to an income jump : 
Only 50% of the change can be expected during the first 20 years, and it takes about 60 years 
to complete 90% of the change.
15 
However, the estimation of (2a) is problematic if T is too large or too small. For large 
Ts, the distance between income in the beginning and end may be so large that the relation 
blurs, but for very small Ts, the estimate of 
T δ  becomes so close to 1 that nothing is left for 
the other variable to explain. Econometrically the relation comes so close to having a unit root 
that the estimates of these coefficients vanish, or the regression crashes. But in the panel 
estimates, small Ts increase the number of periods and thus the number of observations. This 
allows greater precision to be reached so the panel relation may still be estimated if the 
sample contains enough countries. 
In (2a), it is assumed that the lagged dependent variable takes out most of the country 
heterogeneity, especially for small Ts where δ  is close to 1. However, if fixed effects for 
countries are also included, the relation gets closer to the unit root, with the consequences just 
mentioned. Yet, for larger values of T, such as T > 12, one gets results that are robust to the 
inclusion of country fixed effects. Thus, it is easy to eliminate the significance of the β’s by 
combining a small T (such as T = 5) with fixed effects for countries, as done by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005). By contrast, we conclude from the evidence that the 
GT-model (1) and the dynamic model (2a) work well and produce robust estimates of the 
effect of income on democracy.  
We know that the income levels in the world differed by a factor of 2-3 about 200 
years ago. Today, the income levels between the top and the bottom deciles differ by a factor 
of about 40, as shown on Figure 10. When these numbers are inserted into the estimated 
models, they explain the observed differences in the democracy indices rather neatly. 
                                                 
15 Persson and Tabellini (2006) catches the slow adjustment process by a “democratic capital” variable. 
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5.3  PoI: Explaining Growth by Democracy 
The PoI literature that uses the democracy indices to explain growth is much larger than the 
GT literature, though the results are weaker, already for purely statistical reasons. Part of the 
problem is the crowding out of coefficients: Many variables have been tried, and thanks to the 
simultaneity of everything, each variable tends to lack robustness. The reduced form estimate 
in this literature looks as follows: 
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where g is the growth rate of gdp, and the other variables are as before. Due to the statistical 
problems mentioned, a good intermediate variable z is often used to increase the R² so that a 
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The z-variable is good for the purpose if it is robustly related to growth. The typical variables 
tried are investment shares for physical and human capital. It is a problem that human capital 
is a weak variable in growth regressions due to the long lags involved, but human capital is a 
very powerful variable in development accounting, especially if differences in the quality of 
human capital are taken into account (Gundlach et al. 2002). Thus, it is generally believed that 
it must be a strong explanatory variable for long run growth, notwithstanding some remaining 
doubts about the direction of causality (Bils and Klenow 2000). 
  Barro (1991) is the seminal paper using equation (3), which he has replicated in many 
versions in Barro and Sala-i-Martín (2004). The Barro model uses both D and D squared: 
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The total effect of the two D-variables in the Barro model is small. In most of the regressions, 
the estimated coefficients just pass the statistical level of significance, and the implied quanti-
tative growth effect of democracy is almost negligible. Since the relation between democracy 
and growth is politically important, it has been subjected to no less than 90 studies, as covered 
by the recent meta study of Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006). The results of the meta 
study are rather mixed. In general, the reduced form estimates (3) do not find a significant   26
effect of democracy on growth, and the squared form (5) has often failed to replicate on new 
data. However, several two-stage equations (4) have worked in a robust way linking demo-
cracy to growth, notably by using human capital as the intermediate variable. Democracies do 
give significantly more education to their populations than other regimes. 
Apparently there is a positive long run effect of democracy on growth through its 
effect on the intermediate variable, but what matters for policy relevance is the size of the 
effect. Sturm and Haan (2005) supplement the robustness analysis in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) by employing alternative econometric techniques and derive a broadly similar result. 
However, their results are only borderline robust, i.e., the democracy index is not found to be 
among the 10 statistically most powerful explanatory variables. The average growth rate is 
about 1.6 in the average country for the last half century, so what is left to be explained by 
democracy (and other variables) must be small indeed. 
Using the typical orders of magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, we have 
calculated the effects of a difference of 5 and of 10 Polity points over 200 years on two 
countries that start out with the same level of income.
16 The resulting income levels would 
differ by a factor of 1.35 and of 1.82, respectively. At present, the cross-country income levels 
differ by a factor of about 40, and they differed by a factor of 3 200 years ago. Hence, 
causality from democracy to growth can at best explain a small fraction such as 1.82/(40/3) = 
14% or 1.35/(40/3) = 10% of the observed pattern.  
Our reading is that the models building on the GT view can account for the pattern 
observed in Figure 10, while the models building on the PoI cannot. This may explain why 
the GT literature on the democratic transition is small, relative to the PoI literature on the 
effect of democracy on growth: While the GT anglers quickly caught enough fish for a 
satisfactory meal, the PoI anglers have caught a few tadpoles only, and they are getting 
hungrier, so they have to continue.
17 
 
                                                 
16. The effect is taken to be 0.03 percentage points extra growth for one Polity point. Hence, for 5 polity points 
over 200 years, we get 1.0015
200 = 1.35 or for 10 Polity points 1.003
200 = 1.82; see Borooah and Paldam (2006) 
for a more detailed assessment. 
17. Also, it would be much more politically correct if the evidence were in line with the PoI view, so it is an 
embarrassing situation if it is not. It is almost like the macroeconomic literature on development aid effective-
ness, which keeps growing as many researchers cannot believe the tiny effects they are estimating.   27
5.4  GT: The Transition of Corruption  
Figure 11 looks even more convincing in favor of GT than Figure 10. The literature (about 25 
papers) started by Husted (1999), Treisman (2001) and Paldam (2001 and 2002) uses equa-
tions much like (1), employing almost the same variables as before:  
 
11 (6) ' , where   is an index of corruption/honesty ii j j i i Cy x vC α βγ −− =+ + + . 
 
The best data (from Transparency International) begin in 1995. As corruption has strong 
inertia, it is difficult to justify panel methods. Hence, the literature is based on pure cross 
country estimates in levels.
18 However, measures of income and other variables can be lagged 
as indicated. Two stage estimates are also frequently used in this part of the literature.  
The results of the empirical corruption literature are rather clear: Approximately 20 
variables have been tried as controls in (6), and the income variable is by far the most 
powerful explanatory variable. Controls for counter causality do not significantly reduce the 
typical estimates of ß, which is the coefficient of interest. The estimated size of β adequately 
explains the range of the income-corruption pattern displayed in Figure 11. 
 
5.5   PoI: Explaining Growth by Corruption 
Lambsdorff (2003), who is the research director of Transparency International, argues that 
corruption causes income, as per the PoI view. The hypothesis is that corruption determines 
total factor productivity (TFP), which in turn determines income. The Lambsdorff model thus 
holds that C Î TFP Î income, whereas the GT view holds that income Î C. We explore 
the two possibilities for the direction of causality in more detail in Section 6. 
One interesting result of the empirical literature has been that the corruption index 
gives a rather weak and non-robust coefficient when included as a control variable in the 
reduced form equation (3), as shown e.g. in Paldam (2002). However, it is a fairly robust 
variable in two-equation models like (4a) and (4b) when the physical investment ratio is used 
as the intermediate variable, z. This was already discovered by Mauro (1995), and has later re-
appeared in several cross-country investment studies such as Borner, Brunetti, and Weder 
(1995). The corruption index is not among the three strongest explanatory variables in the 
estimated models, but it is often among the three next strongest, and the estimated coefficients 
are typically statistically significant. A common finding of this literature is that corruption is a 
cost that reduces investment, especially if corruption is high and unpredictable.  
                                                 
18. See Paldam (2001) and Lambsdorff, Taube, and Schramm (2005) for surveys.   28
  An alternative view is the “greasing the wheels” theory of the effect of corruption. 
Here, corruption is seen as a mechanism that brings a distorted economy closer to efficiency 
by reintroducing an allocation of resources that is motivated by the price mechanism. Thus, 
we can speak of two effects of corruption on growth: a cost effect and a grease effect, which 
together give a model like 
 
11 211 1 1 21 1 1 (7) ' ( ) ' i i i i jj i i i i jj i i g C R C xu R C xu α ββ γ α β β γ −− − − − − − =− + + +=− − + +, 
 
The usual coefficient 12 1 () i R β ββ− =− is broken into two, with opposing signs. The first C-
term ( 1 β ) is meant to catch the cost effect, so that β1 < 0, while the second C-term ( 21 i R β − ), 
where C is interacted with an index of regulation R, tries to catch the grease effect, so that we 
expect β2 > 0. People of a libertarian persuasion tend to believe that R  is large and hence that 
0, β <  so that corruption is beneficial for growth. A handful of papers, as e.g. Méon and Sek-
kat (2005), have explored these ideas by using various econometric techniques to disentangle 
the two effects. A common finding is that the positive effect of corruption, which originates 
from the second C-term, only becomes important in economies with extreme distortions.
19  
We hence conclude that the causality running from corruption to growth is not a 
strong explanatory factor, but this is not to deny that there is some connection. We can only 
guess about the pattern in corruption 200 years ago, so we cannot make meaningful estimates 
of the potential ability of the PoI view to explain the pattern shown in Figure 11, as we did 
with Figure 10 at the end of the last section. All we can say is that the relative sizes of the 
coefficients appear to suggest the same pattern in both figures, which is more consistent with 
the GT view than with the PoI view. 
 
6. Analyzing  Causality 
 
The purpose of this section is to study the causality between development and the two aspects 
of institutions that we have used throughout: the Polity index (of Figure 10) and the TI index 
(of Figure 11). The Polity index is available for a long time period, so a formal Granger 
causality test can be applied. For brevity, we use the term “cause” for “rejection of Granger 
                                                 
19. The response of the corruption fighters to this finding is that such extreme distortions may be due precisely 
to the desire of the regulators to collect bribes, and hence appears as a second-order effect that overshadows the 
first-order negative effect of corruption.   29
non-causality”. The TI index data are too short for a formal causality test, so we shall make an 
informal analysis, which is suggestive only. 
 
6.1  Causality between the Polity Index and the Level and Growth of Income  
The polity data and the income data contain 10 periods of 10 year averages for an unbalanced 
sample of 155 countries from 1900 to 2000. For about half of the countries, the data series 
start in 1950-60 instead of 1900-10, which actually leaves us with 713 of the potential 1550 
observations. Once we include more lagged variables, most tests can be run for sample sizes 
in the range of 713 to 439 observations (N). The results are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Causality Tests between the Polity Index and the Level and Growth of Income 
Causality  Based on 1 lags  Based on 2 lags  Based on 3 lags  Causality 
From To  F-test  P-value  N  F-test  P-value N F-test  P-value N   
Income Polity  63.6 0.00 713  70.0 0.00 609  51.3 0.00 493 Approved 
Polity  Income  0.73 0.39 711  2.56 0.11 644  0.93 0.33 548  Rejected 
Growth  Polity  0.17 0.68 643  0.05 0.82 575  0.33 0.56 473  Rejected 
Polity  Growth  0.01 0.93 644  0.02 0.90 548  0.73 0.39 439  Rejected 
Note:  The tests use 10 periods of 10 year averages, from 1900 to 2000 for 155 countries, conditional on data 
availability. 
 
  The entries in the first line of Table 6 are derived from the following two models, 
which are estimated for 1, 2, and 3 lags for D (and include fixed effects for countries): 
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Then the causality test is an F-test for (8b) giving statistically significantly smaller residuals 
than (8a). This is the case for Polity as the dependent variable and the level of income as the 
additional explanatory variable. Consequently, we say that income is Granger causing demo-
cracy (first line of results Table 6). The next three lines are derived accordingly, for alterna-
tive combinations of the dependent variable and the additional explanatory variable. In all 
three cases, we reject the hypothesis of Granger causality. We note that our results are in 
accordance with previous results, see Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck (1987). 
Once the database has been established, it is of course easy to implement many alter-
native causality tests. One can check if the results hold for sub-periods and for various groups 
of countries. We have made some such experiments. What we find is that the results   30
presented are the most common ones, but it is also possible to find subsamples of the data 
where the results are different. Put differently, our reported results reflect the main causal 
structure found in the data, but they do not exclusively reveal all connections that exist 
between the selected data series. This means that the GT-view is not so much more powerful 
than the PoI-view as may be indicated by Table 6.  
 
6.2  Causality between the Corruption Index and the Level and Growth of Income 
The corresponding tests cannot be made for corruption since the required time series are too 
short. As an alternative, we use an informal causality analysis based on the correlograms 
shown in Figures 12a and b. The basic idea is to see how the cross-country correlation 
between the index of corruption and income (growth) is affected by using leads and lags. 
When we find that the correlation is higher with a lead in our measure of income (growth) 
than with a lag, it indicates that causality runs from income (growth) to corruption, in line 
with the GT view.  
  Figure 12a is calculated as follows. The first available year for the TI-index is 1995, 
with data for a sample of 41 countries. The last year that we use for the TI index is 2005, with 
data for a sample of 159 countries. Thus, we can draw one correlogram for each of the eleven 
years in 1995-2005, where each correlogram is based on a different number of observations. 
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The unbroken light gray line in Figure 12a represents 21 different correlations across a 
sample of 41 countries, each between the TI index for 1995 and our measure of incomes, 
which we lead and lag by ten years around 1995. So what we find is that the cross-country 
correlation between the TI index for 1995 and the level of income in 1985 (lead 10) is about 
0.765; the correlation between the same TI index and the level of income in 2005 (lag 10) is 
about 0.78, and the contemporaneous correlation is about 0.77. 
Our second correlogram is the thin dark gray line, which represents the correlations 
between the TI index for 1996 and the incomes ranging from 1986 (lead 10) to 2005 (lag 9), 
so here we have 20 correlation points. All further correlograms are constructed in the same 
way, such that our 11
th correlogram represents the cross-country correlations between the TI 
index for 2005 and the incomes ranging from 1995 (lead 10) to 2005 (lag 0). 
For more recent years, the TI-index comes to cover more and more countries, but each 
year we loose one correlation point at the right hand side of the figure because the number of 
possible lags declines as we approach the most recent data. However, for all of our 11 
correlograms we observe a very similar pattern: the curves with the correlation points tend to 
peak with a lead in the measure of income and then continuously fall before they end. We 
have calculated the average fall per year from the peak to the end of each curve and used it for 
a simple linear projection, as shown in Figure 12a. The bold black line shows the average 
pattern based on actual and projected correlations. 
This analysis is surely not a “proof” based on a formal test of causality, but an indi-
cation only. The indication is that it might be easier to argue that causality runs from the level 
of income to honesty, rather than the other way round, because we do not observe that the 
correlations with lagged values of the level of income perform substantially better than the 
correlations with leaded values of income. As a caveat one should note, however, that there is 
no clear trend in the three curves for which the most correlation points can be observed. 
  Figure 12b is the same figure, but calculated for the growth rate instead of the level of 
income. Everything else is the same, and the observed pattern is slightly more pronounced. 
Here, it is possible to argue that growth does lead to honesty – in accordance with the result of 
the analysis from Figure 12a. However, it is hard to argue in reverse that honesty leads to 
growth. It rather looks as if it is corruption that leads to growth. However, the discussion in 
Section 5.5 has shown that the relation from corruption to growth is quite complicated.   32
 


















The relation between institutions and economic development has always attracted the atten-
tion of social scientists. Two views with opposing predictions about the major direction of 
causality can be identified in the literature: the Primacy of Institutions (PoI) and the Grand 
Transition (GT). More recently, the PoI view has become the dominant view in the main-
stream economics literature. We reconsider (some of) the evidence and find much in favor of 
both views. Our essay thus claims that the empirical evidence is far too weak to allow us to 
declare a “winner” of the race between the two views. This finding may appear disappointing 
at first sight, but we would like to emphasize that it should be taken as a warning against the 
uncritical adoption of either view when it comes to formulating development policies.  
Our theoretical discussion has shown that the GT view and the PoI view are both very 
broad, and have some inevitable overlapping. Hence, almost by default, they are difficult to 
subject to a decisive test, but we have seen that it is fairly easy to mobilize selective evidence 
which seemingly proves the relevance of either of the two views. In our view, both views help 
to improve our understanding of the complex process of development. We want to stress in   33
this context, however, that the dynamics of research may have taken prevailing opinions a bit 
too far toward the PoI view. By highlighting that GT is a useful alternative view of 
institutional development, we hope to prevent dogmatism in the application of the PoI view, 
which may lead to disappointing results given the evidence that we have. 
In our empirical analysis of the relation between institutions and development, we 
mainly focus on two measures of institutional quality for which fairly good indices exist, 
across countries and over time. Our first measure refers to the macro institution of democracy, 
which is available for long time series for a considerable number of countries and proxied on 
a democracy/dictatorship axis. The PoI view predicts that the causal direction is from the 
political regime to development, hence from democracy to growth. The GT view predicts that 
a systematic transition from dictatorship to democracy should occur with increasing levels of 
income. On balance, we think that we have demonstrated on the basis of various econometric 
approaches that the GT prediction actually provides a better explanation of the facts, though 
not without exceptions such as India, Mauritius, Mali and the USA, which all became demo-
cracies at a rather early stage of development. 
Our second measure of institutional quality refers to the micro institution of 
corruption, which has recently been made available by Transparency International for a large 
number of countries. Once again, we find that on balance, the empirical evidence appears to 
support the notion that there is a transition from corruption to honesty as the level of income 
rises, with rather limited evidence pointing in the opposite direction of causality. This is not to 
deny that we also find signs that the GT view does not tell the whole story. But taken at face 
value, we would predict that if economic growth continues in China as in the past, the country 
will be as uncorrupt as Singapore in due time.  
Overall, it seems to us that both views tell some important part of the complex story of 
the great process of development. Not only because the GT view has not received much 
attention recently, but especially because both views have meaningful things to say about the 
interaction of institutions and development, it would be a great mistake to rely only on one of 
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